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The inheritance of heterodox economics hinges upon the degree to which the next generation is 
exposed to the history of the discipline’s thought.  The potential to include heterodox thought 
into the curriculum presents itself most easily through history of economic thought classes.  The 
potential is limited by the professor, but it is also circumscribed by the material presented or 
withheld in history of economic thought textbooks.  If included, the presentation of heterodox 
methodologies and philosophies impresses upon students the relevance and importance of 
pluralism and dissenting views and by consequence, the future course of the discipline.  This 
research seeks to examine the presentation of heterodox economics in history of economic 
thought textbooks and to assess the amount of space dedicated to its study and further, to explore 
how textbook adoption impacts the inheritance and heritage of heterodox thought and 
philosophy. 
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“I don’t care who writes a nation’s laws, or crafts its advanced treaties, if I can write its 
economic textbooks” Paul Samuelson (1990, ix) 
 
 The inheritance of heterodox economics hinges upon the degree to which the next 
generation is exposed to the history of the discipline’s thought.    Even within the most orthodox 
of economic programs, the potential to weave heterodox thought into the curriculum presents 
itself within history of economic thought classes.  The potential is limited, of course, at the 
discretion of the professor, but it is also circumscribed by the material presented or withheld in 
history of economic thought textbooks.  Textbooks are the powerful force in any discipline. It is 
through these books that the next generation of employees, employers, and scholars – citizens 
and participants in the democratic process – are bred.  Students become invested in their 
particular professors’ philosophical paradigm and world view often as it is filtered through the 
textbooks they assign.  Indeed, to the nascent and inexperienced scholar, unless otherwise 
explicitly directed by the professor, the textbook represents the definitive word and truth of a 
discipline.   
 History of economic thought textbooks are designed to demonstrate the organization and 
evolution of economic ideas and philosophies, leading to the current disciplinary conventions.  
The general pattern in the presentation methodology of any history of economic thought 
textbook hinges more frequently – although not always or exclusively – upon the chronological 
development of groups of thought as opposed to the bibliographic chronology of individual 
ideas.  Indeed, the limits of book space and classroom time, in addition to the pedagogical 
technique of ‘chunking’ ideas into more easily digestible units of study, demand this type of 
organization.  The presentation, categorization, and descriptive devices employed in any thought 
or methodology textbook often represents a student’s primary exposure (or lack thereof) to 
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disciplinary discordance and in so doing, colors her/his perception and relevance of dissenting 
thought, methodology, and philosophy. 
 There is continued (heated) dispute among economists, specifically, historians of 
economic thought and methodology concerning the constituency of heterodox economics (see 
Wrenn, 2004).  This inquiry seeks to examine the presentation of heterodox groups of thought in 
history of economic thought textbooks.  The procedure is simple.  The first section explores the 
presentation of general dissent in the discipline of economics.  The following sections seek to 
investigate the manner in which unconventional views are further categorized by juxtaposing the 
interpretations of philosophy and thought (if so included) history of economic thought textbooks 
attach to various heterodox groups.  The final section explores whether the textbook presentation 
of non-traditional thought demonstrates similarities and how textbook adoption might impact the 
inheritance of ideas and the philosophical heritage of current heterodox thought.   
Heterodox Economics 
Of the fourteen recent editions of history of economic thought textbooks reviewed (see 
Table 1), two contain a section labeled “Heterodox Economics” within its table of contents. 
While some of the textbooks include a section that groups current non-traditional thought 
together, there is not a standardized categorization or title for them.  In fact, less than half of the 
fourteen textbooks surveyed – Backhouse, Hunt, Landreth and Colander, Rima, Screpanti and 
Zamagni, and Spiegel – group and discuss current dissent from the orthodoxy in either a distinct 
chapter or section reserved specifically for dissenters (see Table 2).  These six textbooks employ 
different methods of organization as well as include different groups in their respective 
discussions.  Additionally, these textbook writers use wide and descriptive phrasing in the title of 
the chapters/sections in order to encompass a broad a range of nonconventional thought, in 
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perhaps an attempt to avoid exclusions or possible dismissal of any given group.  Indeed, while 
current heterodox economics as a collection of systems of economic thought is acknowledged by 
some textbook authors, an agreed upon umbrella name for such economic thought has not 
reached enough consensus within the discipline to warrant a specific taxonomic reference.    
Six of the textbooks group modern nontraditional thought under different headings (see 
Table 2).  Landreth and Colander (2002, 469) sort modern heterodox thought into five categories 
within its chapter titled "The Development of Modern Heterodox Economic Thought:” Radicals; 
Institutionalists, including “modern,” “quasi,” and “neo” Institutionalists; Post Keynesians; the 
Public Choice group; and neo-Austrians.  Backhouse includes a section titled “Heterodox 
Economics” within the chapter “Expanding the Discipline” and discusses Marxist, Radical, 
Original Institutionalists, post-Keynesian, and Austrian thought. In his discussion of current 
dissent in a section within a chapter titled, “An Expanded Profession in Search of New 
Frontiers,” Spiegel (1991, 668) refers to “peripheral movements” or “fringe movements.”  
Among these non-mainstream groups, Spiegel (1991, 669, 671) discusses Radical economics and 
neo-Austrians, as well as a group of thought not listed in other textbooks:  “Supply Side 
economics” – economics as represented through the economic policy of the Reagan 
administration.  Rima (2001, 545, 547) lists the Neo Institutionalists, Radicals, Post Keynesians, 
and Modern Austrians under the chapter title, “Competing paradigms in contemporary 
economics.”  In the introduction to the unit in which this chapter appears, however, Rima (2001, 
482) lists three groups under the title of “Critics:” Post Keynesians, Institutionalists, and 
Marxists while Austrians are organized under the heading of “The Main Stream.”  Some nuanced 
differentiation has thus been made, but the nature of that differentiation is not transparent.   
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Screpanti and Zamagni (2005, xvii-iii) provide two section titles for discordant thought.  
The first, “At the Margins of Orthodoxy” discusses the sub-groups of game and growth theories, 
circular production theories, and Marxist thought.  The second section outlining discordance is 
titled “A Post-Smithian Revolution?” which describes modernism and postmodernism, 
institutionalism and radical political economy. An interesting and unique distinction is made in 
this section between institutionalists and institutional analysis; the former of which includes four 
“unconventional” economists:  Polanyi, Georgescu-Roegen, Hirshman, and Goodwin; while the 
latter dissects what is commonly referred to as New Institutionalism into finer subdivisions:  
“The ‘new political economy’ and surroundings,” “contractarian neo-institutionalism,” 
“utilitarian neo-institutionalism,” “the new ‘old’ institutionalism,” “irreversibilities, increasing 
returns, and complexity,” and “Von Hayek and the neo-Austrian school.”  As well, Screpanti and 
Zamagni weave heterodox thought throughout the remainder of the text, including the 
positioning of the Post Keynesian group alongside orthodox thought in the section titled 
“Contemporary Macro Theory” (2005, 323-77).  Hunt (2002, xii) organizes two heterodox 
groups under the heading of “Contemporary Economics II:  Institutionalism and Post 
Keynesianism,” and within the chapter details the work of Ayres, general Post Keynesian 
economics, and Sraffian economics.  Additionally, and as a separate chapter onto itself, Hunt 
discusses “Contemporary Economics III:  The Revival of Critical Political Economy;” or current 
radical economics.   
 Although Brue and Grant do not offer either a separate section or chapter on 
nontraditional thought, the authors include the evolution of conflicting ideas within a 
chronological timeline on the inside cover of their textbook.  This chronology delineates the 
emergence of groups of economic thought through time with arrows connecting each subsequent 
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group to the prior group that influenced its formation.  What is interesting is that in the legend of 
this timeline, Brue and Grant (2007, inside cover) distinguish between three types of influence:  
“Schools and groups mainly friendly toward predecessors,” “Schools and groups mainly 
antagonistic toward their predecessors,” and “Groups in which some…are friendly toward 
predecessors, but others are antagonistic.”  Brue and Grant thus recognize the historical influence 
of dissenters on the evolution of the discipline, and include chapters on the origins of 
“antagonistic” groups even though they do not recognize modern discordance in a formal way in 
their presentation of current conventional economic thought.   
Thus, no consensus has emerged in the history of economic thought textbook literature 
with respect to the nature and consequently, the presentation of heterodox economics.  Moreover, 
the conspicuous absence of a section devoted to modern day dissent or integration thereof in over 
half (eight of the fourteen) of the History of Economic Thought textbooks surveyed underscores 
the inconsistent presentation of dissident thought.  This is not to say that all differences are 
excluded; certainly some of the more famous dissidents of the past are included within the 
textbooks, indeed, all discuss the works of some of the more famous figures such as Marx, 
Veblen, and Keynes.  Descriptions of modern nonconventional views remain vague and focused 
on critiques of mainstream thought; describing heterodox thought via opposition rather than 
composition.  
The purpose of higher education is to encourage and develop critical thinking, creativity, 
and “thinking outside the box,” and as such, certainly the example set by current heterodox 
groups of thought in the discipline provides an even larger lesson than a list of objections or 
hypothesized shortcomings of conventional thought.  Teaching students a plurality of views 
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encourages students to challenge and question ideas and emphasizes that what goes unchallenged 
grows stale, complacent, and as such, lacks relevancy and innovation.    
Austrian Economics 
 Perhaps the most controversial in terms of its categorization, heterodox or mainstream, is 
the Austrian (or neo-Austrian) group.  Part of the difficulty in presentation likely stems from the 
historical evolution of Austrian economic thought; after all, Menger is credited with the birth of 
marginal analysis from which neoclassical thought developed as well as the founding of the 
Austrian group.  The following bulleted list offers a concise, yet clear accounting of the 
representation of Austrian economics in history of economic thought textbooks.   
• No separate section/chapter or rolled into Marginalist Revolution discussion:  Breit and 
Ransom, Brue and Grant, Heilbroner, Roll, Vaggi and Groenewegen 
• Chapter/section  
o Historical reference and not specified as dissenting:  Ekelund and Hebert, Blaug 
o Specified as dissenting:  Backhouse (non-categorized), Fusfeld (non-categorized), 
Landreth and Colander, Speigel, Screpanti and Zamagni 
o Specified as mainstream:  Hunt 
o Specified as both:  Rima     
 Certainly, the Austrian economics of the Menger period should be considered different 
than that of the modern era.  Through the decades, Austrian economics evolved as well as 
splintered into different currents of thought so that its modern incarnation is not a direct lineage 
from its predecessors.  Landreth and Colander (2002, 494-5) point to the 1960s as a watershed 
decade for the (neo)-Austrian group as it distanced itself finally and distinctly from conventional 
thought as a reaction to the increasing formalization of the mainstream and its increased focus on 
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general equilibrium theory, modeling, and econometrics.  According to Rima (2001, 553), the 
differences between the Austrian group of the Menger years and the current Austrian group are 
noticeable and thus, “the term Austrian has come to have different meanings among 
contemporary practitioners.”  This is clear given the double taxonomy Rima (2001, 482 and 547, 
respectively) gives to the Austrian group, whereby they are listed as part of the mainstream and 
as part of chapter titled “Competing paradigms.”  Presentation of modern Austrian thought is 
thus complex and depends on the textbook author’s interpretation of that evolution and the 
weight she/he assigns to any single current of thought.  Which textbook is adopted by any 
particular professor thus determines the manner in which students are introduced to Austrian 
economic thought.  
The Austrians as Mainstream 
Hunt classifies modern Austrian thought as conspicuously mainstream by citing the 
Austrians’ application of a priori assumptions to all social and historical contexts.  As such, 
Hunt contends that Austrians minimize the human element in economic decision making to that 
of extreme rationality and in the process, focus too narrowly on the act of exchange (Hunt, 2002, 
464, 470-3).  The Austrian rationality/maximization argument moreover serves as the foundation 
for their strident advocacy for free markets, and that, “rational maximizing exchanges… prove 
that, in every respect, a free market, capitalist system is the best of all possible worlds” (Hunt, 
2002, 472).  Hunt further asserts that this ideological undercurrent remains unrecognized by the 
Austrians who claim “their theory is pure, value-free science…that only their theory merits the 
name economics and that their theory is equally valid for all people, in all social systems, in all 
times” (Hunt, 2002, 465, emphasis original).  
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Hunt therefore stands in adamant opposition to the segregation of modern Austrian 
thought from the orthodoxy, claiming that modern Austrians merely represent the conservative 
branch of the mainstream:  “The school of neoclassical economists that advocates extreme 
laissez-faire capitalism…represents two separate but similar groups – the Austrian School and 
the Chicago School” (Hunt, 2002, 464).  The comparison that Hunt draws is not between the 
orthodoxy and the Austrians, but rather between the liberal and the “conservative” branches of 
the mainstream.  The Austrians are thus only distinct from the more liberal branch of the 
orthodoxy and only within the context of their unflagging support of free markets (Hunt, 2002, 
464-5).   
While Hunt stands alone in his resolute assertion of the orthodox nature of the modern 
Austrian group, he is not the only author to suggest that Austrian economics displays orthodox 
inclination.  Rima, for instance, states that the similarities between the Austrian and mainstream 
Chicago groups of thought are the reason that some historians of economic thought no longer 
consider them to be separate and distinct groups:  “The emphasis of Chicago scholars on 
subjectivism, marginal analysis, opportunity cost, and libertarianism became so fully absorbed 
into…the mainstream that some…view Austrian economics as a school whose separate identity 
came to an end in the 1930s” (Rima, 2001, 552-3).  This perceived integration may be the reason 
that the modern Austrian group is not singled out in seven of the fourteen textbooks.  Perhaps the 
Austrians are so much a part of the mainstream, textbook authors do not find it necessary to state 
as much.   
The Austrians as Dissenters 
Of the six textbooks that differentiate and detail modern nontraditional thought from the 
economics mainstream, four suggest that current Austrian economic thought should be counted 
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among the ranks of the dissenters.  Backhouse specifies that Austrian economics is heterodox 
and established itself as such at a conference in the early 1970s (2002, 315-6), while Landreth 
and Colander (2002, 360-1) trace the Austrian split from the orthodoxy to the years following the 
Second World War.  As economics focused on formalist modeling of perfect competition, the 
Austrian group “began to part company with mainstream neoclassical economics …Neoclassical 
economics became a theory of prices; Austrian economics became a theory of economic process 
and institutions.”   Moreover, it is contended that the modern Austrian group deems 
mathematical analysis as a functional and unsuitable methodology for the study of economics 
that should instead be non-‘scientistic’ and based upon human behavior and more specifically, 
human choice (Ekelund and Hebert, 2004, 509-11; Landreth and Colander, 2002, 361).  The 
movement in economics toward predictive econometric analysis represents another deviation, as 
prediction is not as important as description for the modern Austrian group (Ekelund and Hebert, 
2004, 511).  Indeed, Screpanti and Zamagni specifically underscore, “the radically heterodox 
nature of the neo-Austrian approach when compared with neoclassical mainstream” (2005, 496). 
Method, however, does not present the only point of departure according to these 
textbook authors – Austrian theory also differs from that of the orthodoxy.  Authors make clear 
distinctions between the “radical subjectivism” (Ekelund and Hebert, 2004, 509-10) of modern 
Austrian theory and the subjectivism of the mainstream.  As such, Austrian subjectivism is 
extended to include the differences in human knowledge and interpretation of that knowledge; 
which then translates into utility and cost assessment that is not standardized for the generic 
individual (Screpanti and Zamagni, 2005, 496-7, 499-500).  Continuities in time, consumption, 
production, and the formation of tastes and knowledge according to these depictions of Austrian 
economics, are interpreted as an Austrian critique of unrealistic assumptions of the orthodox 
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paradigm (Ekelund and Hebert, 2004, 511; Screpanti and Zamagni, 2005, 496-7).  Rima (2001, 
553, 561) further speculates that the Austrian conceptualization of non-probabilistic uncertainty 
represents “considerable consensus” with Post Keynesianism, a traditionally heterodox group 
(Rima, 2001, 553).  Two textbooks also highlight the Austrian belief that disequilibrium is more 
the rule than the exception (Landreth and Colander, 2002, 361; Screpanti and Zamagni, 2005, 
496, 498, 500).       
What is as interesting as the debate between whether or not the modern Austrian group 
should be classified as orthodox or heterodox is the implicit debate in the relevance of modern 
Austrian thought.  That seven out of fourteen do not discuss the modern contributions of this 
group is important.  Whether this indicates that modern Austrian thought is no different than the 
mainstream and thus does not deserve to be highlighted as a separate and distinct group, or 
whether its exclusion is indicative of the mainstream’s dominance within the history of economic 
thought is unclear.  A student’s understanding of Austrian economics clearly depends on the 
adopted textbook’s presentation or omission of Austrian thought.   
Institutionalism 
Textbook authors employ a variety of methods in discussing the Institutionalist tradition.  
To be certain, reference to “Institutionalist” thought requires some distinction beyond the generic 
title as two distinct groups of thought bearing the name co-exist.   Only Landreth and Colander 
make finer distinctions, outlining the traditional, quasi-Institutionalist, and neo or new 
Institutionalist consortiums.  The remainder of the textbooks either keep their discussion strictly 
to Original Institutionalist thought, as in the work of Veblen, Commons, and Mitchell, or, dissect 
Institutionalism into a ‘then and now’ analysis:  then as in the Veblenian or Original (Old) 
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Institutionalist group, now as in the New, sometimes Neo Institutionalist group as typified by 
transaction costs and property rights analysis.   
Original (Old) Institutionalism 
 Writers of history of economic thought textbooks agree that the rise the Original (Old) 
Institutionalist group (OIE) and its firm objections to abstracted theory parallel the rise of 
neoclassical orthodoxy.  Although one textbook (Screpanti and Zamagni) dissects new 
generations of OIE between carriers of the original tradition and its “twin” evolutionary doctrine 
with a Marxist undertones in Europe, the OIE present a recognized and persistent tradition (2005, 
489-91).  Rima (2001, 548-9), although referring to their work as “Neo-Institutionalist,” lists and 
describes the work of two second generation OIE:  Clarence Ayres and John K. Galbraith.  
Moreover, those textbook authors who discuss the modern OIE group agree as evidenced in their 
respective descriptions with respect to both what of the orthodoxy the OIE rejects and what 
comprises the OIE research program.   
 The authors describe the scope of Original Institutional thought more broadly than the 
mainstream.  According to these authors, the frame of inquiry in OIE thought recognizes and/or 
endogenizes mainstream exogenous variables such as: the evolution of technology, the existence 
and impact of power relations (Hunt, 2002, 481-2; Screpanti and Zamagni, 2005, 484-9) as well 
as discordant relationships, and the incorporation of social institutions (Brue and Grant, 2007, 
371-2; Hunt, 2002, 482-3).  Authors present the OIE as more contextually driven and generally 
agree that the OIE employ an interdisciplinary and holistic methodology (Brue and Grant, 2007, 
370-1; Landreth and Colander, 2002, 477; Screpanti and Zamagni, 2005, 487). Accordingly, the 
OIE reject certain foundational concepts of orthodox economics: the employment of static, 
equilibrium analysis (Brue and Grant, 2007, 370-1, 373-4; Landreth and Colander, 2002, 478; 
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Rima, 2001, 548-9) and rejection of the Benthamite calculation in economic choice (Brue and 
Grant, 2007, 379-80).      
The only disagreement between textbook authors with respect to the development of OIE 
thought emerges in the description of its legacy and impact on modern orthodoxy.  Blaug (1997, 
703) denies the existence of a modern version of the Original Institutionalist tradition:  “…the 
institutionalist movement ended for all practical purposes in the 1930s.”  Furthermore, both 
Blaug (1997, 702) and Ekelund and Hebert (2004, 433) claim that there does not presently exist a 
coherent or robust enough body of thought to be singled out as representative of the modern OIE 
tradition.  Landreth and Colander (2002, 477) claim that while Original Institutionalism has been 
credited for spotlighting critical issues over the years, in the post World War II period, it remains 
inept at penetrating the inner circle of mainstream economic theoretical analysis; Ekelund and 
Hebert (2004, 419) agree but also state that the ideas of the OIE have incrementally crept into 
economic discourse, pointing to Leibenstein’s Veblenian good and its upward sloping demand as 
an example.  Backhouse credits the survival of the OIE through the latter part of the twentieth 
century to the popular culture work of John K. Galbraith (2002, 314-5). Screpanti and Zamagni 
describe the “new ‘old’ institutionalism” in continuing relevancy through succeeding generations 
of scholars, such as J. Fagg Foster, John K. Galbraith, and Marc Tool who pushed the Original 
Institutionalist tradition through to the new millennium.  The authors as well, credit the 
succeeding generations of OIE as having inspired New/neo-Institutionalist thought (2005, 484-
9).  All of the textbooks surveyed present similar perspectives:  that whatever influence the OIE 
has managed to interject into orthodox theory, its systematic exclusion remains pervasive, “…the 
central core of economic theory is about as ‘noninstitutional’ as it was in Veblen’s day…micro 
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economic theory is still concerned primarily with the kind of ‘equilibrium’ which Veblen so 
severely criticized” (Gordon as quoted in Brue and Grant, 2007, 373-4).   
New Institutionalism 
 The textbook authors do not treat the New Institutionalist group in any systematic 
manner.  In fact, nine of the fourteen textbooks surveyed (listed below) do not present New 
Institutionalist economic (NIE) thought in a distinct section.  The exclusion could be the result of 
an expansive program that prevents a perceived coherency or methodical presentation of the 
NIE’s research program.  Indeed, as Brue and Grant note (2007, 393), the NIE consists of groups 
with different areas of focus, such as that of property rights, economics and law, transaction cost 
analysis, and public choice theory.  Such diversity might in fact prevent a coherent or concise 
description within a history of economic thought textbook.  The lack of methodical treatment of 
the NIE, however, instead could evidence authors’ perception that the New Institutionalists 
should be considered another sub-branch of the mainstream.   
• No separate section/chapter:  Backhouse, Blaug, Breit and Ransom, Fusfeld, Heilbroner, 
Hunt, Rima, Roll, Spiegel, Vaggi and Groenewegen 
• Chapter/section  
o Dissenting or expanding, but still connected to the mainstream:  Brue and Grant, Ekelund 
and Hebert, Landreth and Colander 
o Specified as dissenting:  Screpanti and Zamagni 
The few texts that treat the New Institutionalists as a distinct group of thought do not 
present vigorous arguments regarding the heterodoxy, or more broadly, the dissent of the NIE.  
Indeed, the NIE are associated with other groups that seem to fall between the heterodox and 
orthodox camps.  According to three of the history of economic thought textbooks (see above), 
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the NIE program as presented upholds some of the more basic tenets of orthodox economics.  As 
such, textbook authors present the NIE as expanding the boundaries of conventional economics 
rather than expressing a departure per se.  Brue and Grant (2007, 373, emphasis original), for 
instance state that through the NIE; orthodox economists have made significant “neoclassical 
contributions.”  The inclusion of equilibrium analysis, for instance, remains integral to NIE 
analysis, yet within a recognized institutional framework (Landreth and Colander, 2002, 490).  
Accordingly, assumptions of rationality are maintained, once again, within a specified 
institutional setting (Brue and Grant, 2007, 373; Ekelund and Hebert, 2004, 426).  As such, the 
NIE as described by history of economic thought textbook authors retains the theoretic structure 
of orthodox economics (Brue and Grant, 2007, 393).   Even Landreth and Colander (2000, 490), 
who list the NIE in their heterodox chapter state that the NIE, “…in many ways is a part of 
modern mainstream economics rather than a heterodox group.”   
  One textbook describes New Institutionalism as definitively heterodox.  Screpanti and 
Zamagni detail the research agenda of what they term as the “new political economy,” and 
furthermore unambiguously emphasize the distinction between orthodox economics and new 
political economy.  The title “new political economy” is used by the authors as an umbrella 
category which contains what other authors describe as borderline orthodox/heterodox groups: 
New Institutionalism, Public Choice, Behavioralism, and property-rights groups inspired by the 
work of Hayek, Tullock, and Buchanan.  While Screpanti and Zamagni describe a broad range of 
economic issues which constitute their respective research agendas, they also argue that all of 
these groups contextualize economics within political institutions and are “united in an ambition 
to go beyond the limits placed by conventional theory on the analysis of economic effects of 
institutions” (2005, 475-6).    
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 Screpanti and Zamagni elaborate on the contrast between orthodox and heterodox 
economics in a comparison of the scope of conventional versus the new political economy, 
whereby the latter focuses its analyses on legal institutions, comparing the impact of different 
legal institutional configurations on economic outcomes, while conventional theory assumes 
legal infrastructure as exogenous and static for the purposes of determining the economic 
outcome within given institutional constraints (2005, 475-6).   Screpanti and Zamagni also 
elaborate on the group “neo-institutionalism” – differentiated by non-distinct borders from New 
Institutionalism – which is sub-divided into two groups:  contractarian and utilitarian neo-
institutionalism.  Each of these sub-branches are unique in their respective approaches to 
economics, both are contrasted against orthodox economics in particular by their systematic 
inclusion of institutions into economic analysis (Screpanti and Zamagni, 2005, 476-84). 
 Authors either weave New Institutionalism into discussion of mainstream theory, while 
those who distinguish New Institutionalism as an established group of thought range from those 
who hedge on the heterodoxy of the group to the authors Screpanti and Zamagni, who in the 
latest edition of their textbook assert NIE is in fact heterodox.  Once again, the existence, 
presentation, and contributions of NIE thought hinge on which textbook might be adopted. 
Post Keynesian 
 The textbook authors surveyed disagree with respect to the genesis of the Post Keynesian 
group. One textbook claims that the 1950s and 1960s as the watershed era when Joan Robinson 
and other Cambridge economists began to dissociate with the neoclassical group, specifically 
with the insurrection against the emerging neoclassical growth models of that time (Screpanti 
and Zamagni, 2005, 351-2).  Screpanti and Zamagni (2005, 349-58) further differentiate Post 
Keynesians into the “American group” (Davidson, Minsky, S. Weintraub) which focuses on 
 17 
monetary Keynesian analysis, and the “Cambridge” group (Kaldor, Pasinetti, Robinson) which 
focuses on issues in growth and distribution – both of which maintain their heterodox 
classification.  Fusfeld and Rima (2002, 210; 2001, 554, respectively), however, date the advent 
of the Post Keynesian group to the 1960s and 1970s while Backhouse dates the emergence of 
“post-Keynesian” thought to the work of Eichner and Kegel in the early 1970s (2002, 315).  
Hunt (2002, 477, 485) marks the emergence during the 1970s and 1980s with the work of 
Robinson and Sraffa developed in reaction against the neoclassical synthesis.    
 While the history of the Post Keynesian tradition is somewhat contentious, more 
consensus surfaces among the textbook authors regarding the heterodoxy of the Post Keynesian 
group (Rima, 2001, 554-60).  Indeed, the Post Keynesian nickname (created by Joan Robinson) 
for the economics of the neoclassical synthesis – “bastard Keynesianism” – leaves little doubt 
with respect to the Post Keynesian position on the orthodoxy’s absorption and interpretation of 
Keynesian thought (Landreth and Colander, 2002, 491).  Though the same heretical deviations 
from the mainstream are not always offered as proof of the heterodoxy of the Post Keynesians, 
none of the respective descriptions of Post Keynesian thought contradict one another.   
 The Post Keynesian belief that inflation stems from the struggle between labor and 
capital over the distribution of income (Brue and Grant, 2007, 465-6; Rima, 2001, 554-5) 
supports the Post Keynesian critique of orthodox marginal productivity theory in the 
determination of the distribution of income (Rima, 2001, 554).  This theoretical entry point, 
coupled with the belief that uncertainty (Hunt, 2002, 486-7; Landreth and Colander, 2002, 492) 
with respect to future expectations determines the level of investment in the economy (Hunt, 
2002, 487) reinforces the observation by three of the textbook authors that Post Keynesians 
suggest the business cycle is inherently unstable (Brue and Grant, 2007, 465-6; Fusfeld, 2002, 
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213; Landreth and Colander, 2002, 492).  Likewise, the rejection of neoclassical price theory and 
the profit maximization rule of equating marginal cost and marginal revenue and its replacement 
with the theory of mark-up pricing whereby firms set price above that of marginal cost (Brue and 
Grant, 2007, 465; Screpanti and Zamagni, 2005, 354-5) all present concepts that complement 
one another.  Indeed, the suggested characteristics of Post Keynesian thought not only fit 
together well, but also counter the perceived shortcomings of the orthodoxy with its own 
alternative theories.   
The only semantic break from the general consensus occurs within the text by Spiegel 
who describes the work of what other authors call Post Keynesian as “neo-Keynesian,” for 
instance, as that work which attempts to dislodge the entrenched mainstream theory of 
distribution based on marginal productivity founded upon the early neoclassical work Joan 
Robinson (Spiegel, 1991, 669).  Other disagreement with respect to the Post Keynesian group 
revolves around whether they are most closely aligned with the modern Austrian (Rima, 2001, 
553, 561) or Radical group (Spiegel, 1991, 669; Hunt, 2002, 477-8).  These discrepancies are 
minor and the textbook authors’ description of Post Keynesianism, when presented, consistent.  
Thus, the concern with respect to the adoption of different history of thought textbooks centers 
specifically on the historical context of the group’s development and in the semantics of its 
name. 
Radical/Marxist 
 Among the textbook authors who discuss the modern incarnation of Radical/Marxist 
thought, there is little doubt as to its heterodox status.  Despite the many strands of current 
Marxist thought, textbook authors, perhaps for the sake of simplicity, stick to as generic a 
rendering of radical thought as possible.  With the exception of Backhouse, all of the authors use 
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the term “Radical” and the term “Marxist” synonymously and interchangeably when discussing 
current thought (Fusfeld, Hunt, Landreth and Colander, Rima, Screpanti and Zamagni, Spiegel); 
although each author notes that there exist many distinct traditions of thought within the broader 
group.  Backhouse differentiates radical and Marxist thought, stipulating that radical thought 
(since the late 1960s) explores the same issues as Marxist thought, but uses analytical tools 
different than those of traditional Marxism (2002, 315).  Screpanti and Zamagni separate and 
explicate different branches of Marxism under the heading of “Radical Political Economy:” 
monetary circuit theory, structural change theory, analytical Marxism, Post Marxism, and 
Feminist theory (2005, 500-15).  Additionally, the authors include a chapter on Marxism in the 
section, “At the Margins of Orthodoxy” which discusses the heretics of the orthodox Marxist 
tradition who attempt to deconstruct Marxist thought and contemporize it while maintaining its 
modernist meta-narrative (2005, 446-52).  Fusfeld (2002, 213) separates original Marxist thought 
from modern thought in his description of neo-Marxist thought:  Marxism modernized by the 
Baran and Sweezy publication of Monopoly Capital.  
Radical thought is also cast as an ideologically charged approach to the discipline.  The 
modern Radical group of thought experienced a renaissance and became a modernized, 
recognized body of intellect during the latter half of the 1960s, fully acknowledged with the rise 
of the “New Left” (Rima, 2001, 551) and the establishment of the Union of Radical Political 
Economy in 1968 (Spiegel, 1991, 669).  The emergence of Radical thought has been credited to 
the social and political upheaval of the Vietnam and Watergate era where dissatisfaction with the 
economic system as opposed to the orthodox economic theory found expression (Fusfeld, 2002, 
213-4; Landreth and Colander, 2002, 474; Spiegel, 1991, 669; Screpanti and Zamagni, 2005, 
450-1).  By linking the re-emergence or revival of Marxist thought to historical changes suggests 
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that these authors are willing to attach ideological distinctions to the identification of heterodox 
versus orthodox1.   
 The Radical group of thought, though it undeniably has its roots in Marxist theory, varies 
by degree in the adherence to and interpretation of the original Marxist doctrine.  Despite the 
various incarnations of Radical theory, and with the exception of analytical Marxism, all are 
united in their critique of mainstream economics which is suggested to support the current social 
structure of accumulation.  The abstracted theoretic of the mainstream poses a significant 
problem to the Radical group, specifically with respect to the idea of a harmonious equilibrium 
where the Radicals instead see conflict and class exploitation (Landreth and Colander, 2002, 
475).  Additionally, the Radical group of thought claims that many of the variables the orthodoxy 
classify as exogenous or given, such as class relations and institutions, must instead be 
endogenized (Landreth and Colander, 2002, 475).  The root of Marxist theory lies in Marx’s 
critique of the capitalist system as opposed to a discussion of or an appeal to communism per se.  
This critical assessment and proposed restructuring of society demonstrates the sharp dividing 
line between the Radical group and the orthodoxy (Landreth and Colander, 2002, 475; Rima, 
2001, 551-2).  The last important point of distinction that constitutes the clear break from the 
orthodoxy is the deliberate and conscious integration of Radical thought with the other social 
sciences with economics (Hunt, 2002, 507).  
 All of the textbooks that examine the modern Radical/Marxist tradition unanimously 
agree on its widening of the scope of orthodox thought.  Granted, the infusion of Marxist thought 
into the orthodox framework, as exemplified by analytical Marxism, serves to blur what would 
otherwise be a marked distinction.  Textbook authors generally agree that the acceptance of ideas 
                                                 
1 Screpanti and Zamagni also speculate that the resurgence of Sraffian theory in the 1960s freed mathematical 
economists in the 1970s to enter Marxian theory and by proxy allowed for the resurgence of radical thought writ 
large (2005, 503).    
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generated by the radical group have been few, with notable exceptions in the areas of education, 
labor, and industrial organization (Landreth and Colander, 2002, 476; Spiegel, 1991, 670).  Two 
authors point out that even if the ideas have not been systematically incorporated, Radical 
thought has enjoyed some degree of influence in highlighting the anomalies within conventional 
thought (Rima, 2001, 547-8; Roll, 1992, 262).  The method textbook authors employ in 
explaining radical political economic thought – whether it is presented as a generic catch-all 
group or is sub-divided with detailed explanation of its various branches – determines whether 
students are introduced to the range of ideas encapsulated in modern Radical thought if at all, 
demonstrating once more how textbook adoption plays a critical role in its respective 
interpretation.   
Other 
 Landreth and Colander (2002, 471) list the Public Choice group as one of the major 
current heterodox movements, albeit on the edge of heterodoxy as Public Choice thought has 
been the “most successful” in penetrating the mainstream.  Ekelund and Hebert include a 
discussion of the Public Choice group as an extension of the classical and neoclassical traditions 
into the political science realm without suggesting that such extensions should be classified as 
dissent per se (Ekelund and Hebert, 2004, 532).  These authors agree on the components of the 
basic premises of Public Choice and how it utilizes a similar framework to the classical and 
neoclassical methodologies, as well as that it differs, at least in scope, from the modern, formalist 
focus of the mainstream (Ekelund and Hebert, 2004, 532-3; Landreth and Colander, 2002, 494; 
Screpanti and Zamagni, 2005, 479).  Backhouse describes Public Choice theory as “close to 
being heterodox, though not quite deserving of the title” (2002, 316).   
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 Landreth and Colander, Screpanti and Zamagni, and Speigel label a handful of other 
current groups of thought as heterodox or as departing from the mainstream.  Landreth and 
Colander alone mention Libertarian, Black, and Feminist economics as groups operating outside 
the mainstream that deserve to be singled out, but that are generally included as an area of 
specialization under one of the larger heterodox groupings (Landreth and Colander, 2002, 496).  
As previously mentioned, Spiegel lists Supply-side economics as a “periphery group” that 
believes Keynesian analysis should be extended from a strictly demand purview to include 
supply in its discussion of fiscal policy (Spiegel, 1991, 671).  Screpanti and Zamagni (2005, 428-
45) also list “Games, Evolution and Growth” and “The Theory of Production as a Circular 
Process” under the heading of its section describing groups on the fringe of conventional 
thought.  The marginal presentation, or more frequently non-inclusion of smaller pockets of 
nonconventional thought, exposes students to fewer current heterodox groups of thought and 
consequently does not present to students the range of possibilities.   
The Accordance of Discordant Thought 
 Textbook resources are as plentiful as job postings for historians of economic thought.  
Increasing formalization means a decreasing need for the history of ideas.  In order to capture 
how authors describe current economic thought of the past half century, the present survey 
includes history of economic thought texts published during the past 20 years.  Restricting the 
survey to texts published within the past 10 years leaves ten texts to survey, within the past five 
years, the number shrinks to four, all of which are reprints or new editions of older texts.  Sadly, 
both universities and publishers put few resources into the history of economic thought.  The 
current global economic crisis proves that a teleological approach to the evolution of ideas 
cannot work; context matters, history matters.  
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 Given the broad mission yet limited space, history of economic thought textbooks 
typically offer a heavy sampling of orthodox ideas. Current economic thought that might be 
considered different is either relegated to a catchall chapter, omitted altogether, or mentioned 
alongside orthodox ideas specifically for the purposes of contrast. While those textbook authors 
who discuss current nontraditional thought agree which groups are distinctly heterodox – 
Original Institutionalist, Post Keynesian, Marxist/Radical – there is general disagreement on the 
origins, evolution, and impact of these groups on orthodox thought.  The Austrians, New 
Institutionalists, and the Public Choice groups are not uniformly presented across or within 
history of economic thought textbooks.  Authors of history of economic thought textbooks do not 
present consistent examinations or discussions of dissenting thought in the discipline.2   
 Any presentation method or description ultimately serves to distinguish the conventional 
approach from dissent and at least hints to students that orthodox thought has not evolved 
linearly nor followed an inevitable path to its current incarnation.  The manner and detail in 
which discordant thought is presented, however, communicates a perceived significance of 
heterodox thought in the discipline which varies amongst authors.  While important, semantics 
takes a backseat to the depth of discussion.  The objective of a history of economic thought class 
is to explain the evolution of economic thought and philosophy, but as well to discuss in a 
consistent manner, the existence and more importantly, the possibility of economic thought that 
departs from the conventional.  Without the empowerment to question the legitimacy of ideas 
and precepts of the mainstream, the future history of the discipline faces stagnation, staleness, 
and anachronism of thought.  The inheritance, heritage, and future vitality of heterodox 
economic thought weigh in the balance.  . 
                                                 
2 Fred Lee recently published a book (release date April, 2009) titled, A History of Heterodox Economics: 
Challenging the Mainstream in the Twentieth Century, which – when adopted – promises to serve as the authority 
on the history of heterodox economics.      
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Tables 
 
Author Title
Backhouse The Penguin History of Economics
Blaug Economic Theory in Retrospect
Breit and Ransom The Academic Scribblers
Brue and Grant The Evolution of Economic Thought
Ekelund and Hebert A History of Economic Theory & Method
Fusfeld The Age of the Economist
Heilbroner The Worldly Philosophers
Hunt History of Economic Thought:  A Critical Perspective
Landreth and Colander History of Economic Thought
Rima Development of Economic Analysis
Roll A History of Economic Thought
Screpanti and Zamagni An Outline of the History of Economic Thought
Spiegel The Growth of Economic Thought
Table 1:  History of Economic Thought Textbooks
 
 
 
Table 2:  Chapters/Sections Dedicated to Modern Heterodox Thought 
Author Separate Chapter/Section 
Backhouse “Expanding the Discipline, 1960 to the Present” 
Hunt 
"Contemporary Economics II:  Institutionalism and Post 
Keynesianism" 
"Contemporary Economics III: The Revival of Critical Political 
Economy" 
Landreth and 
Colander "The Development of Modern Heterodox Economic Thought" 
Rima "Competing paradigms in contemporary economics" 
Screpanti and 
Zamagni 
"At the Margins of Orthodoxy" 
“A Post-Smithian Revolution?” 
Spiegel "An Expanded Profession in Search of New Frontiers " 
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